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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses a relationship between market reforms and economic growth in post-communist economies. Compo-
nents of the EBRD reform index (EBRD transition indicators) were used as measures of reform progress. Based on the 
estimations of panel data for 25 transition economies for 1989–2003 it is shown that progress in market reforms have a 
positive impact on GDP growth. The main contributors to economic growth are governance and enterprise restructuring, 
banking sector reform, and trade and foreign exchange liberalization. Three groups of countries were specified: advanced 
reformers, partial reformers, and non-reformers. Non-reformers appeared to grow faster than partial reformers, but as 
they have repressed, soviet-type regimes, reliability of these countries’ official statistics is very low, and GDP is likely to 
be overestimated. Hence, one can conclude that the gap between non-reformers and advanced reformers is widening or at 
least persists, while the partial reformers could reduce this gap implementing comprehensive reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the economic transition in CEB and FSU countries there was a wide range of 
empirical research on factors of economic growth in these countries. There are two groups of the 
papers: first that analyses growth in single countries (these papers are usually based on neoclassical 
models of economic growth) and second that aimed to reveal determinants of cross-countries differ-
ences in growth performance. But neither first, nor second provided any explanation of GDP growth 
in Belarus. Moreover, some papers from the second group call economic growth in Belarus “a 
miracle” (Havrylyshin et al., 1998; Fischer and Sahay, 2000). “Growth accounting” papers also can 
explain neither recession nor recovery in Belarus (Chubrik, 2002). 
This paper analyses determinants of cross-countries differences in GDP growth performance 
of transition economies. The main focus of the research is a relationship between economic growth 
and progress in reforms measured by the EBRD transition indicators). As the analyzed indicators 
(independent variables) are highly correlated, simple regressions were estimated based on the fol-
lowing approach. First, two models (with fixed and random effects) are estimated for a pair of vari-
ables (growth vs. EBRD transition indicator). Second, a choice of the model is made based on 
Hausman specification test statistics. Third, the selected model is tested for significance of individ-
ual effects (based on F-test and LM-test statistics for the models with fixed and random effects re-
spectively), and the final model is chose. 
The paper is organized as following. The second section provides a very brief review of the 
literature related to the subject. The choice of model specification is made in the third section. The 
main results of econometric analysis are presented in the final part of the paper. 
 
2. The Literature Review 
 
A large share of empirical research on transition economies’ growth performance deals with expla-
nation of cross-countries differences based on the political economy of growth. This theory states 
that the quality of institutions is important for growth. As it has many “dimensions” (bureaucratic 
efficiency, degree of corruption, protection of property rights, the rule of law, etc.) it could explain 
differences in per capita income and in GDP growth rates between different countries that neoclas-
sical models refer to “total factor productivity”. Additionally, empirical models based on the politi-
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cal economy of growth allow taking into account neoclassical assumptions including output per 
capita into a list of independent variables. 
Very briefly, recent literature related to the subject of the paper (e.g. De Melo et al., 1997; 
Havrylyshyn et al., 1998, 2000; Fischer, Sahay 2000; Garibaldi et al., 2002, etc.) provides the fol-
lowing conclusions: 
− The key determinants of economic growth in transition economies are macroeconomic stabil-
ity, structural reforms, and minor state interference (small government expenditures); 
− Market institutions development matters growth, but it is not the main factor of it; 
− Initial conditions influence growth through the following channels. First, the more initial distor-
tions of the economy’s structure, the more time is needed to improve them, the deeper output 
decline is. Second, abundance of natural resources is conducive to investment attraction, but it 
slows reforms because it allows maintaining soft budget constraints. Third, the closer a country 
to the Western Europe and the smaller the period of socialism, the easier adaptation of eco-
nomic agents to new institutional environment is and the more liberal economic reforms are. 
− The biggest welfare growth occurred in the countries that aimed at EU accession. 
At the beginning of transition period post-communist economies have soviet-type institutional 
environment and should change it to the new (capitalist) one. This should lead to increase of alloca-
tion efficiency. Hence, in the medium term economic growth performance depends on the quality of 
the new environment. The closer the new environment to the capitalist one, the more optimal re-
source allocation is, and the higher growth rate faces the country. Hence, the reforms progress 
should explain output behavior, or at least differences in growth rates of different economies. Tran-
sition indicators, calculated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, could be 
used as measures of reform progress. The relationship between these indicators and economic 
growth in transition economies is analyzed further. The analysis captures 25 post-communist 
economies1 for the period 1989–2003. 
 
3. The Model Specification 
 
A typical panel regression for transition economies has the following specification: 
 it i it ity a b x ε′= + ⋅ + , (1)
where there are the k regressors in xit without constant term (i = 1,…, n (n – the number of cross-
sections), t = 1,…, T (T – the number of periods)), yit – GDP growth rate, ai – individual effects, b′ – 
vector of regression coefficients. 
Table 1. Correlation between EBRD transition indicators 
 BRIRL CP GER LSP OIR PL SMNB SSP TFES 
BRIRL* 1.00         
CP 0.75 1.00        
GER 0.93 0.81 1.00       
LSP 0.86 0.79 0.88 1.00      
OIR 0.85 0.71 0.81 0.79 1.00     
PL 0.70 0.60 0.68 0.71 0.59 1.00    
SMNB 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.55 1.00   
SSP 0.81 0.69 0.81 0.82 0.72 0.80 0.70 1.00  
TFES 0.86 0.67 0.83 0.82 0.72 0.82 0.68 0.85 1.00 
* BRIRL – banking reform and interest rate liberalization, CP – competition Policy, GER – governance and enterprise 
restructuring, OIR – overall infrastructure reform, LSP – large scale privatization, PL – price liberalization, SMNB – 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, SSP – small scale privatization, TFES – trade and foreign ex-
change system. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
                                                 
1 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hun-
gary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Taji-
kistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
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As a rule, independent variables (xit) include inflation or its natural logarithm, proxy for initial 
conditions, and different indicators of reforms’ progress. There are two problems concerning this kind 
of specification. First, a number of early papers (e.g. Havlylyshyn et al., 1998, 2000) don’t undertake 
any testing for fixed vs. random effects specification. Second, they include into regressors lists vari-
ables that are closely correlated2. Any of these problems could lead to misspecification of the model. 
EBRD transition indicators closely correlate with each other (Table 1). Evidently, these indi-
cators cannot be included in the right side of the growth equation simultaneously. Thus, in equation 
(1) the number of regressors k reduces to 1. 
Further estimation is based on the following approach. First, two models (with fixed and ran-
dom effects) are estimated for a pair of variables (GDP growth (yit) vs. EBRD transition indicator 
(xit)). Second, based on Hausman specification test statistics, a choice of the model is made. Third, 
the selected model is tested for significance of individual effects (based on F-test and LM-test statis-
tics for the models with fixed and random effects respectively). Thus, there three possible types of 
specification: 
1) Model with fixed effects 
 it i it ity a b x ε′= + ⋅ + . (2)
2) Model with random effects 
 0 ε′= + ⋅ + +it it it iy a b x u , (3)
where a0 is a constant term, ui – error component characterizing the ith observation and constant 
through time. 
3) Model without individual effects 
 0 ε′= + ⋅ +it it ity a b x . (4)
In the most cases the models were specified as (2), i.e. include fixed individual effects (Table 
2, columns 1-4). In order to exclude heteroskedasticity problem that appears in models with fixed 
effects and without individual effects, heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics were used. 
Table 2. GDP growth and EBRD transition indicators 
Beta-coefficient Hausman1 F2 LM3 Specification4 Coefficient Intercept Value Rank  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BRIRL 37.0** 2.0** -- FE, h 6.2** -- 0.61 2 
CP 19.9** 1.4 -- Pooled LS, h 4.3** -8.3** 0.32 8 
GER 35.2** 1.9** -- FE, h 7.4** -- 0.62 1 
OIR 29.6** 1.7* -- FE, h 7.2** -- 0.58 5 
LSP 34.7** 2.0** -- FE, h 5.1** -- 0.57 6 
PL 3.6 -- 22.4** RE 1.9** -6.9** 0.24 9 
SMNB 20.2** 1.3 -- Pooled LS, h 4.7** -8.6** 0.38 7 
SSP 28.6** 1.7* -- FE, h 4.4** -- 0.59 4 
TFES 39.3** 2.1** -- FE, h 4.2** -- 0.61 3 
1 Hausman – Hausman specification test statistics for fixed/random effects (Hausman, 1978). 
2 F – F-statistics for presence of individual effects in the model with fixed effects (see, for instance, Greene, 1997). 
3 LM – LM-statistics for presence of individual effects in the model with random effects (Breush, Pagan, 1979). 
4 Specification – specification selected based on Hausman tests and tests for presence of individual effects: 
FE, h – model with fixed effects; t-statistics are heteroskedasticity consistent; 
Pooled LS, h – pooled OLS; t-statistics are heteroskedasticity consistent; 
RE – model with random effects. 
* – coefficient is significant at 5% level, ** – at 1% level. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
                                                 
2 To avoid the second problem one can use “general to specific approach” (see, for example, Garibaldi et al., 2002). But 
in the case of static model individual effects help to eliminate omitted variables problem. Thus, in order to estimate how 
each of the regressors relates to dependent variable, one can use simple regressions with one independent variable. 
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4. The Results 
 
Regression coefficients of all EBRD transition indicators appeared to be significant at 1% level 
(Table 2, columns 5 and 6). In order to estimate a contribution of each variable to GDP growth, the 
beta-coefficients were estimated using the formula 
 
( )
( )
σβ σ= ⋅
it
it
xb
y
, (5)
where ( ), ( )σ σit itx y  are mean-squares of an EBRD transition indicator and the GDP growth for i 
and t. This enabled to rank the regressors normalizing each coefficient b on variance of the depend-
ent variable. 
Governance and enterprise restructuring, banking sector reform, and trade and foreign ex-
change liberalization contributed most to economic growth in transition economies (Table 2, col-
umns 7 and 8). Small contribution of price liberalization can be explained with the fact that most of 
the post-communist countries succeeded in implementation of this reform at the early stage of tran-
sition, whether they implemented other reforms or not. Creation of securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions, as well as competition policy, did not progress much in the most economies, 
having rather small impact to economic growth too. One can anticipates the increase of their contri-
bution to GDP growth in the medium term. 
Another finding of this analysis is that the more comprehensive the reforms are, the faster the 
growth is. The general impact of the reforms on growth could be find regressing GDP growth on 
average of EBRD transition indicators (EBRD reform index). Evidently, more comprehensive re-
forms associate with higher EBRD reform index. 
Using the same algorithm of specification choice the following regression with fixed effects 
were estimated: 
 (9.0)6.3it i it itGR a EBRD ε= + ⋅ + , (6)
where GRit – GDP growth rate, EBRDit – average of EBRD transition indicators, heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics is in parenthesis. It shows that higher EBRD reform index associates with 
higher GDP growth. Thus, the more progress in reforms is achieved, the faster economy growing. 
According to the EBRD ranking methodology, the countries could be divided into 3 groups: 
advanced reformers (countries with EBRD reform index in 2003 above or equal 3.67 (4-)), interme-
diate/partial reformers (reform index in 2003 was less then 3.67 but above or equal 2.67 (3-)), and 
non-reformers (reform index in 2003 was less than 2.67). Countries from the first group have fin-
ished the first-stage reforms (i.e. reached Western economies’ level in small scale privatization, 
price liberalization, and trade and foreign exchange liberalization), and other reforms are on a 
strong track. Partial reformers have a substantial progress in the first-stage reforms, but other re-
forms are still rather slow of was started in a recent years. Finally, non-reformers still lack almost 
all reforms, or started some of them in very recent years. 
According to the results of the econometric analysis, growth rates in advanced reformers 
should be the highest, while in non-reformers – the lowest. The average growth rate in the first 
group of countries is 1.4 percentage points higher than in the last one (Table 3). This is equal to 
23% of GDP growth during the 15 years. But the gap between advanced and partial reformers is 
much higher: 2.3 percentage points (41% during 15 years), and one can conclude (following, for 
example, Havrylyshyn et al., 1998) that absence of reforms was better than partial reforms. 
At the same time low average growth rate in partial reformers was due to huge decline in 
three countries: Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Excluding these countries gives the average 
growth rate for partial reformers at -0.6%, i.e. only 1 percentage point lower than in advanced re-
formers. Additionally, all non-reformers refers to non-free countries (concerning political rights) 
according to Freedom House rating methodology (Freedom House, 2004), and four of these coun-
tries (Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) are completely non-free in terms of eco-
nomic freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2004). They occupy the 145th, 146th, 149th, and 150th places 
of 155 respectively. These countries have soviet-type regimes with restored system of central plan-
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ning. Evidently, output statistics is likely to be substantially distorted (overestimated) in these coun-
tries. In addition to the soviet-type system of central planning, Belarus, for instance, has both condi-
tions pointed by Khanin (Khanin, 1991) needed to overestimate GDP growth: high inflation and fast 
renewal of product families. Moreover, there is every reason that Belarusian authorities have been 
using this possibility since 1996 (Chubrik, 2003). Thus, the actual GDP growth in the non-
reformers is likely to be lower than the reported one. Another case for partial reformers is that these 
economies often have a big shadow economy, while in non-reformers it is substantially lower due to 
repressed regimes. This could contribute GDP growth in partial reformers, and also in advanced re-
formers at the early stages of transition (Aslund, 2001). 
Table 3. Reforms progress and GDP growth 
Average for 1989–2003  EBRD reform index in 2003 EBRD reform index1 GDP growth rate, % 
Hungary 3.85 3.19 1.0 
Poland 3.66 3.09 2.0 
Czech Republic 3.67 3.00 0.6 
Slovakia 3.48 2.81 1.0 
Estonia 3.67 2.81 0.3 
Slovenia 3.37 2.78 1.1 
Croatia 3.33 2.62 -0.8 
Latvia 3.48 2.59 -0.9 
Lithuania 3.48 2.58 -1.1 
Average for advanced reformers2 3.55 2.83 0.4 
Bulgaria 3.26 2.40 -1.1 
FYR Macedonia 2.93 2.39 -1.6 
Romania 3.04 2.29 -1.0 
Russia 2.92 2.27 -1.6 
Kyrgyzstan 2.81 2.26 -1.4 
Moldova 2.70 2.15 -5.3 
Kazakhstan 2.89 2.14 -0.4 
Albania 2.67 2.11 2.3 
Armenia 2.96 2.10 0.1 
Georgia 2.92 2.10 -6.1 
Ukraine 2.74 1.97 -4.1 
Average for partial reformers 2.89 2.20 -1.9 
Without Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine 2.93 2.24 -0.6 
Azerbaijan 2.59 1.81 -2.5 
Uzbekistan 2.08 1.77 0.7 
Tajikistan 2.26 1.67 -3.3 
Belarus 1.81 1.52 0.5 
Turkmenistan 1.30 1.22 -0.4 
Average for non-reformers 2.01 1.60 -1.0 
Average 2.96 2.31 -0.9 
1 The countries are ranked at the average of the EBRD reform index for 1989–2003. 
2 All averages are simple arithmetical averages, except average GDP growth rates for the single countries. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The first-stage reforms – price liberalization, small-scale privatization and trade liberalization – are 
necessary, but not sufficient for sustained economic growth. Only comprehensive reforms, including 
enterprise restructuring, banking reform, large-scale privatization and other measures, are growth-
enhancing. This is because they allow creating “right” incentives for all economic agents – the main 
“panacea” for long-run economic growth (Easterly, 2002). Hence, the gap between non-reformers 
and advanced reformers will widen or at least persist, while the partial reformers could overwhelm 
this gap implementing comprehensive reforms. 
Reforms progress appeared to be a bad predictor of GDP growth in Belarus. Alternative esti-
mates show that it was overestimated (Chubrik, 2003). But even primary output data in Belarus is 
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distorted (IMF, 2004), thus, official data couldn’t be overestimated correctly. At the same time, a 
number of researches show that GDP growth leads to increase of household income, especially of 
the poorest’ one (Easterly, 2002). Hence, welfare of the population in Belarus should be at the level 
of advanced reformers with similar GDP growth rates. But Belarus has much lower average wage 
than most of CEB countries; life expectancy at birth in Belarus is lower too. Thus, even if GDP 
growth in Belarus is as high as it is reported, its quality is less than one of GDP growth in advanced 
and even partial reformers. In order to catch-up Belarus has to implement the same reforms as these 
countries did. 
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